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1! BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Maritime industry witnessed catastrophic accidents 
throughout years such as Herald of Enterprise, Costa 
Concordia and Deep Water Horizon. Human or or-
ganisational errors are highlighted as the main rea-
sons of these accidents which caused fatalities, ship 
losses and environmental pollution. IMO (2002) 
VWDWHG WKDW ³Shipping is perhaps the most interna-
tional of all the world's great industries and one of 
the most dangerous´6KLSSLQJFRmpanies are trying 
to address human errors in a reactive way and try to 
develop measures to avoid reoccurrence of those er-
rors, which have quite big impact in maritime do-
main currently.  
It was stated that maritime transport is 25 times 
riskier than air transport according to the accounts 
for deaths for every 100km (Berg, 2013). In the same 
paper, it was stated that operation of ships are sub-
ject to full of regulations, procedures and guidelines, 
which are expected to be adhered to by crew and of-
ficers. However, in some situations, instruction giv-
en to the bridge team may not be appropriate and 
may constitute supervisory violations as leaders find 
it difficult to adapt their instructions to changing sit-
uations due to possible poor safety culture. Similar-
ly, Debra et al. (2007) reports that coastal pilots in 
Australia and New Zeeland could not report hazards 
as much as they would like to due to the commercial 
pressure from the client shipping companies. A sur-
vey conducted reveals that 71% of port pilots in New 
South Wales and 62% of port pilots in Western Aus-
tralia agreed that commercial pressure forces pilots 
working outside established rules (Debra et al., 
2007). 
International Safety Management (ISM) code, in-
troduced in 1998, is aimed to bring self-regulation to 
the maritime industry. ISM is criticised due to its bu-
reaucratic nature as it forces seafarers to fill many 
forms and FKHFNOLVW UHVXOWLQJ LQ VHDIDUHUV¶ WLPHDQG
focus are taken away from working safely 
(Bhattacharya, 2012). ISM requires shipping compa-
nies to develop work procedures involving manage-
ment of risks, maintenance of ships and equipment, 
emergency preparedness as well as reporting inci-
dents, accidents and near misses while auditing the 
current systems. On the other hand, due to downsiz-
ing of workforce, seafarers are expected to be multi-
tasking and work longer hours while having fixed 
and short term contracts. In the same paper, howev-
er, survey with managers indicated that most com-
mon cause for acFLGHQWV DW VHD ZDV VHDIDUHUV¶ QRQ-
FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK 606 LQGLFDWLQJ VHDIDUHUV¶ DSDWK\
towards following procedures (Bhattacharya, 2012). 
On the other hand, seafarers claimed that it is not the 
SMS but their skills gained through their long expe-
rience helped them to maintain shipboard safety.  
Three types of errors identified by Reason (Rea-
son, 1990) can be listed as Skill Based Performance, 
Rule Based Performance and Knowledge Based Per-
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formance. Rule based performance is the riskiest of 
all since rule breaking is seen as the contributory 
factor in most of serious incidents/accidents (Skalle 
et al., 2014). Rule Based mistakes are done by the 
crew for a good reason as they do not intend to cause 
damage; people fail to apply the correct rule or pro-
cedure or expressed in another way, or implement an 
inappropriate rule and mostly caused by misjudging 
the problem (Skalle et al., 2014). In the same paper, 
following a procedure is classified as both rule based 
and knowledge base, and therefore requires a lot of 
judgement to adjust the procedure to specific situa-
tions. 
Knudsen (2009) states that efforts to improve 
safety resulted in increasing volume of regulations, 
control and paper work such as checklist, workplace 
assessment and risk assessment, and many seafarers 
view that these demands on seafarers are imposed by 
people who do not understand anything about sea-
IDUHU¶VOLIHDQGZRUNRule following in several cases 
is seen as counteracting work against the proper 
seamanship. This may be due to the not well devel-
oped rules/procedures. Since humans are logical ac-
tors, deliberate additions and subtractions may be 
conceded irrespective of perceived risks in order to 
VDWLVI\ HPSOR\HUV¶ GHPDQG IRU HIIiciency and 
productivity (El-Ladan and Turan, 2012). 
Due to the lack of standardisation between ves-
sels and poorly designed Standard Operating proce-
dures, measures introduced to eliminate the errors 
fail to sustain desired level of safety. Standardisation 
is described as the accumulation of the efforts to 
prevent failures which were revealed based on acci-
dent investigations and the aggregations of learnt 
lessons from these accidents (Bieder and Bourrier, 
2013). In maritime industry, even equipment, layout 
and operating practices of two sister ships can be dif-
ferent. When crew members start working on anoth-
er vessel of the company, they need to create their 
own checklists to perform their tasks and encounter 
with several problems due to aforementioned factors. 
Maritime and aviation sectors, who are the leaders of 
the transportation, are heavily relying on standardisa-
tion by utilising Standard Operating Procedures, to 
achieve the desired level of safety. 
2! STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES IN 
MARITIME 
Standard Operating procedures are designed to show 
best and qualified practices to seafarers to perform 
their tasks, but in reality, tasks may differ in every 
ship due to non-standardisation. An early Dutch in-
vestigation association analysed accidents with re-
gards to loss containment in chemical industry and 
revealed that 50% of the accidents related to proce-
dures and this 50% consist of no or unclear proce-
dure (10%), wrong procedures (12%) and current 
SURFHGXUHVZHUHQ¶WIROORZHGSURSHUO\ 
The Standard operating procedures are claimed 
that they may not be compatible with real shipping 
operating environment and it created the well-known 
GLOHPPD ³ZRUN DV LPDgLQHG´ YV ³ZRUN DV GRQH´
Work as imagined described as what designers, 
managers, regulators and authorities believe happens 
or should happen. Work as done refers what actually 
happens. Also all of the efforts to standardise the 
ship operation by SOPs are ended up with excessive 
amount of paperwork which is almost very demand-
ing challenge for seafarers. 
3! SEAHORSE APPROACH 
SEAHORSE Project aims to investigate the human 
performance problems through focusing on the mari-
time workarounds. $³workaround´ in the context of 
SEAHORSE Project is ³WKH GHOLEHUDWH FKDQges that 
the crew have applied to standard procedures and to 
the equipment on ships, due to practical and other 
QHHGV´ Therefore, a workaround can also be ex-
plained as a method of creating a temporary solution 
to a problem or limitation in a system when usual 
defined procedure is not working. By this definition 
it is necessary that these workarounds should be 
monitored and analysed with the aim of properly ad-
dressing the limitations in system. Delcore (2009) 
proposes that workarounds can be used as a useful 
source of ideas for the improvement of products and 
services, SEAHORSE Project is developing a sys-
tematic approach to capture and learn from the mari-
time workarounds in order to achieve safer and more 
effective maritime operations. 
SEAHORSE Smart Procedure Methodology will 
compare predefined SOPs and maritime worka-
rounds reported by crew members. Reported worka-
round will be assessed in terms of risk and benefits 
by 3 different experts after securing anonymity of the 
data. After analysis of the reported workaround by 
experts, a feedback form will be sent to crew mem-
bers explaining whether workaround is safer than the 
actual SOP or workaround has crucial risk potential. 
4! QUESTIONNAIRES 
SEAHORSE Project initially aimed to capture the 
current maritime workarounds through application of 
anonymous surveys. The SEAHORSE Project¶ ques-




Figure 1. Sections of SEAHORSE Questionnaire 
 
SEAHORSE Questionnaire is carefully developed 
with an interdisciplinary group to ensure that it cap-
tures the information, which is required to conduct 
further analysis (Questionnaire can be accessed via 
http://www.seahorseproject.eu/Questionnaire/tabid/4
608/Default.aspx). 
The first section of the questionnaire aimed to 
collect demographic information about the partici-
pants such as: their role/rank on board, nationality 
and seagoing experience. However, it was ensured 
that anonymity of participants are protected, there-
fore, no personal information is collected which may 
lead to identification of the person. The second sec-
tion focusses on capturing the attitudes of a seafarer 
where participants were asked to agree or disagree 
with the given statements by using a Likert Scale 
(i.e. never, rarely, some-times, often, and always). 
An example statement is shown below; 
 
³Job tasks and related procedures required to be 
followed on ships are easy to follow´ 
 
In this section attitude statements were carefully 
selected and categorised in following sections; pro-
cedure design, training and competence, safety cul-
ture, employee - employer trust, matching proce-
dures to operational reality. Third section is asked in 
an open-ended form which aims to capture the in-
formation related to workarounds as follows; de-
scription of workaround, related standard operating 
procedure (SOP), frequency, type of operation, un-
derlying reason for the workaround.  
Currently, returned questionnaires are being ana-
lysed and preliminary results are discussed in the fol-
lowing section. 
5! PRELIMINARY QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
The aim of the SEAHORSE-Smart Procedure Sur-
vey is to capture general understanding of the seafar-
ers towards safety. The questions are asked about 
VHDIDUHU¶V GHPRJUDSK\ DWWLWXGHs and the worka-
rounds that they performed. Totally, 451 numbers of 
UHVSRQVHV DUH UHFHLYHG DERXW VHDIDUHUV¶ DWWitude and 
295 numbers of responses are received about mari-
time workarounds. 
5.1! Demographic Analysis 
The statistical analysis was performed by utilising 
6366 WR LGHQWLI\ VHDIDUHU¶V UDQNV RYHUDOO VHDJRLQJ
experience, operation type, number of procedure 
they face on a daily basis. The majority of the sea-
farers are masters and chief officers with the per-
centage of 25% and 14% respectively. It presents 
participants of the surveys are quite expert on the 
bridge operations (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of participants¶ role on-board ships 
 
The seagoing experience varies significantly 
among participants as it ranges from couple of 
months to 56 years. The average seagoing experi-
ence is found as 11.16 years with the standard devia-
tion of 11.04 according to descriptive statistical 
analysis on SPSS. The overall seagoing experience 
distribution is given below in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Overall seagoing experience distribution 
 
According to survey which was distributed in the 
world wide, majority of the seafarers work on tanker 
ships with the 31%. It is followed by the dry cargo 
and other commercial vessels by 22% each (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Vessel type 
 
54% of the seafarers work on deep-sea shipping 
companies (Fig. 5). Deep-sea shipping operation has 
ad hoc difficulties due to excessive number of oper-
ating days. This operation type was followed by 




Figure 5. Operation type of shipping companies 
 
Standard Operating Procedures are designed to 
provide the best way of working for seafarers and 
according to the type of operation, seafarers need to 
deal with number of tasks by following the relevant 
procedures on a daily basis. 31% of seafarers deal 
with up to 5 SOP per day while 20% of the seafarers 
deal with 15+ operating procedures (Fig. 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of operating procedures 
5.2! Attitudes Results 
In the attitude section of the questionnaire, the inten-
tion was to measure the safety climate in the compa-
ny. In total 48 attitude questions were asked and 
questionnaire was structured as below: 
‚! Procedure Design 
‚! Training, competence 
‚! Safety Culture 
‚! Employee ± Employer Trust 
‚! Matching Procedures to Operational Reality 
 
Each heading has several statements to capture 
the general views of seafarers about that specific ar-
ea. There is a still big debate on what extend SOPs 
reflect the operational realities. Seafarers stated that 
majority of Standard Operating Procedures are fac-
tually incorrect. Also, seafarers are doubtful if really 
SOPs reflect best way of working or even they make 
the operations less efficient as described in Figure 7 
and Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 7. Statement: Job tasks and related procedures required 
to be followed on ships are factually incorrect 
 
Figure 8. Statement: Some procedures that crew need to follow 
as part of their job tasks make the job less efficient 
 
Significant efforts are invested to enhance compe-
tency of the crew members with appropriate and 
continues trainings by shipping companies to sustain 
desired level of safety. However, seafarers stated in 
the survey that they are not always trained on how to 
deal with unusual conditions (Fig. 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Statement: In our company crew members are trained 
on how to deal with unusual (infrequent) conditions (e.g. unex-
pected circumstances which are not defined in the procedures 
and guidelines). 
 
SOPs are introduced to maritime domain for eve-
ry single task and for every crew member from dif-
ferent rank but many of them ignore following them 
and adopt their own alternative way due to many 
reasons. Figure 10 illustrates that 37% of the crew 
sometimes follow the defined SOPs. 
 
 
Figure 10. Statement: In shipping companies, it is common that 
procedures are not always followed. 
 
In order to establish a good employer ± employee 
trust, there should be anonymous reporting system 
where crew member can report impractical SOPs to 
avoid possible risks to person, ship and environment. 
Figure 11 indicates that only 26% of the companies 
have this system in their SMS. 
 
 
Figure 11. Statement: In our company, there are systems on 
board which allow crew members to report impracticable pro-
cedures anonymously. 
 
Personnel Protective Equipment is extremely im-
portant for maritime operations to protect human 
from dangerous situations. Figure 12 shows that 
most of the people determined that they use PPE 
when it is required but workaround survey results 
show that ignoring the use of PPEs are very common 
in maritime domain. 
 
 
Figure 12. Statement: The members of our crew, use personal 
protective equipment when required. 
5.3! Workaround Results 
There is a common understanding in maritime do-
main that the shipping is highly regulated and sea-
farer needs to deal with numerous standard operating 
procedures on board ships. Due to high workload on 
board ship, seafarers sometimes develop their own 
approach to perform their tasks instead of strictly 
following SOPs. 
In our questionnaire, 295 seafarers provided data 
about SOPs about a specific task and the alternative 
way to achieve their goals. Also they provided in-
formation about where they adopt this alternative 
procedure, what type of operations it is, what are the 
benefits of the following alternative way and wheth-
er this workaround is well accepted or not. 
According to collected data from seafarers 
worldwide, the most frequent types of workarounds 
are identified as below: 
 
‚! Paperwork ( details provided as an exam-
ple case) 
‚! Personal Safety Equipment 
‚! Work-Rest Hours 
‚! Navigational Standards & Rules 
‚! Hot-work & permit to work 
 
Case: 
Paperwork is very well known issue in maritime 
domain. Most of the seafarers complain about that 
WKH\FDQ¶WSHUIRUPWKHLUDFWXDOWDVNGXHWRH[FHssive 
amount of paperwork. Danish Maritime Authority, 
(2013) stated that ³When it comes to paperwork, 
most seafarers think that there is too much paper-
work and documentation involved in many tasks, and 
that this takes up too much time and energy´ 
The example below indicates a very well-known 
workarounds with regards to paperwork 
 
Definition of SOP: Prior to port arrival, and as 
sole navigator on the bridge, I spend most of my 
time in the chart room completing pre-arrival check-
lists and fixing the ship's position on paper charts. 
Many of the items on the checklists are either re-
peated or non-applicable. Ironically, as we move 
closer to the coast and to busier waters frequency of 
the fixing position is increased to align with the pro-
cedure. However, this distracts my attention from my 
main role of physically navigating the ship, it reduc-
es spatial awareness. Procedure states that I can 
call the Master if workload becomes excessive, but 
due to limited manning I know he needs rest and 
such a call would be unwelcome. As an employee I'm 
expected to deal with it! 
Definition of Alternative Way: Some crew com-
pletes the checklists after arrival, thus defeating 
their purpose. Some crew members ignore position 
fixing requirements and complete it at a more com-
fortable frequency. 
Prevalence: Some of the crew members follow 
the same alternative practical way 
Type of Operation: Bridge operation 
Location: Navigation/communication control 
space 
Reasons: Time constraint, need to focus attention 
to sailing the ship. 
Benefits: Attention is focused on sailing the ship; 
this is fundamentally the most important aspect re-
garding the goal of getting the ship safely to port. 
Risks: One may overlook important checks; trust-
ing electronic means of monitoring the ship's posi-
tion removes a valid safety barrier. 
 
Participants of the survey asserted that all of these 
workarounds adopted by most of other crew mem-
bers as well with the percentage of 37 (Fig. 13).  
 
 
Figure 13. Statement: Please select the statement which suits 
best to the alternative practical procedure that you have defined 
in (b) 
 
The majority of the workarounds is held in deck 
operation (42%) and followed by the engine room 
operation and bridge operation by 29% and 21%, re-
spectively (Fig. 14). 
 
 
Figure 14. Types of operation 
21% of the workarounds are performed at the en-
gine room (Fig. 15). It was followed by complete 
vessel and navigation/communication on control 
space with the 17% and 11% respectively. 
 
 
Figure 15. Location of workarounds 
6! FUTURE WORK 
Risk & benefit analysis will be performed to com-
pare all of these identified maritime workarounds 
and SOPs. The results is expected to indicate which 
way is safer and better. Good practices will be pro-
moted and will turn into new Standard Operating 
Procedures. New actions will be developed to avoid 
reoccurrence of the bad practices. 
7! CONCLUSION 
Standard Operating Procedures are developed to 
generate best and safest practices in the maritime in-
dustry but study showed that crew members adapt 
their own alternative ways to perform their tasks. 
Even though some workarounds are unacceptable in 
terms of safety, the analysis of maritime workaround 
revealed that high numbers of SOPs are not well de-
signed. They do not reflect the maritime operational 
reality and they are ambiguous or impossible to fol-
low on board ships. It was observed that sometimes 
seafarers cRXOGQ¶t explain SOPs of the tasks properly 
in the survey, this indicates that seafarers sometimes 
fail to understand actually what SOPs mean. 
It was revealed that there are some workarounds 
which are conducted for real reasons however the 
chosen workaround is not the best way to address the 
problem. Also some of the crew members thought 
that their workaround was beneficial but actually the 
performed workaround breaches the international 
laws. 
Finally, all of performed workarounds show that 
the maritime industry still have issues with regards 
to safety. Good practices are required to turn them 
into procedure while bad practices should be elimi-
nated. Sometimes the reason why they perform this 
workaround is more important than the workaround 
itself. 
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